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The Myth of  Liberum Ius 
ad Bellum: Justifying War in 
19th-Century Legal Theory and 
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Abstract
The proposition of  so-called liberum ius ad bellum claims that European states in the 19th 
century were no longer bound by the moral criteria of  just war (bellum iustum) but that 
they held a sovereign right to go to war. This thesis is widely accepted among scholars of  
the history of  international law and international relations alike. Nevertheless, the realist 
perspective on international relations was challenged in 19th-century international legal 
discourse. Several contemporary international lawyers were in favour of  the legalization of  
international relations in order to legally ban unilateral war. Not much attention has so far 
been paid to the controversial debate on liberum ius ad bellum, which appears particularly 
in late 19th-century legal treatises. In the present article, this dispute will be analysed by 
comparing different normative justifications and criticism of  war in 19th-century inter-
national legal doctrine. As will be shown, by confronting legal doctrine with contemporary 
state practice, the narrative of  liberum ius ad bellum constitutes a myth in the history of  
international law.
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1 Introduction: Reconstructing a Myth: From Bellum 
Iustum to Liberum Ius ad Bellum?
The notion of  a Right to go to war, cannot be properly conceived as an element in the Right of  
Nations. For it would be equivalent to a Right to determine what is just not by universal exter-
nal laws limiting the freedom of  every individual alike, but through one-sided maxims that 
operate by means of force.
– Immanuel Kant1
[W]ar is simply the continuation of  policy with the addition of  other means.
 – Carl von Clausewitz2
The history of  war is also a history of  its justification. Throughout the centuries, mil-
itary force has been justified and criticized with reference to narratives framed from 
multiple normative spheres: politics, morality and law.3 At the heart of  this scholarly 
search for the normative foundations of  international order lie the theories of  just war 
(bellum iustum).4 In early modernity, the theory of  bellum iustum was contested – in 
particular, the idea of  the just cause (causa iusta) – the normative core of  the doctrine 
of  the ‘just war’ – had lost its plausibility for many lawyers against the background of  
confessional disputes and the formation of  the modern nation-state and its monopoly 
of  power.5 The discourse on justifying war was caught between the political will to 
power, natural law and secular concepts of  legalization.6
Following Wilhelm G.  Grewe (1911–2000), an overwhelming scholarly major-
ity believes that there has been a turn in legal treatises in the early modern times as 
part of  a historical process of  overcoming the moral theological approach of  just war 
(bellum iustum).7 This process, argues Grewe, was finally completed in the 19th cen-
tury; Grewe and his followers therefore support the theory of  so-called liberum ius ad 
bellum. It suggests that, in the 19th century, European states were no longer bound 
by the moral criteria of  bellum iustum but that they held the sovereign right to go to 
war. ‘Whenever the problem of  war was seriously discussed from an international law 
perspective,’ writes Grewe, ‘the principle of  the freedom to wage war … emerged.’8 
1 I. Kant, Project for a Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay (1795, reprinted 1891), at 99.
2 C. von Clausewitz, On War (1832, reprinted 1976), at 605.
3 Benjamin, ‘Critique of  Violence’, reprinted in P.  Demetz (ed.), Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, 
Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (1978) 277; H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of  Order in World 
Politics (2nd edn, 1995), at 180–183; S.C. Neff, War and the Law of  Nations: A General History (2005); 
O’Connell, ‘Peace and War’, in B.  Fassbender and A.  Peters (eds), Oxford Handbook of  the History of  
International Law (2nd edn, 2014) 272; Brock, ‘Frieden durch Recht: Anmerkungen zum Thema im his-
torischen Kontext’, in P. Becker, R. Braun and D. Deiseroth (eds), Frieden durch Recht? (2010) 15; Lesaffer, 
‘Too Much History: From War as Sanction to the Sanctioning of  War’, in M. Weller (ed.), Oxford Handbook 
of  the Use of  Force in International Law (2015) 35.
4 S.C. Neff, Justice among Nations: A History of  International Law (2014), at 67.
5 O. Asbach and P. Schröder (eds), War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe (2010).
6 I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of  Force by States (1963), at 5; O’Connell, supra note 3, at 275; 
A. Tischer, Offizielle Kriegsbegründungen in der Frühen Neuzeit: Herrscherkommunikation in Europa zwischen 
Souveränität und korporativem Selbstverständnis (2012), at 22, 220ff.
7 W.G. Grewe, The Epochs of  International Law, translated and revised by Michael Byers (2000).
8 Ibid., at 531.
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Consequently, bellum iustum would have lost its relevance as a normative framework 
during the 19th century. This thesis is widely accepted,9 whereas some scholars have 
argued that the justification of  war in the 19th century has been an extra-legal phe-
nomenon.10 Only recently, the continuing importance of  natural law for the justifica-
tion of  the use of  force has been problematized.11
Interestingly enough, the 19th century does not seem to have been of  great scien-
tific interest to research concerning the bellum iustum theory and, more generally, the 
justification of  war so far. Questions regarding the ‘just war’, the resort to war, ius ad 
bellum and its justification have widely been ignored. This is puzzling. Only since World 
War I has the just war doctrine gradually been rediscovered,12 while it seems to have 
been ‘in the shadows’, though not fully forgotten, during the 19th century.13
There is some evidence that so far not enough attention has been paid to the doctrine 
and the legal treatises of  the 19th century with respect to the question of  a normative 
judgment on the resort to war. Grewe’s argumentation seems to support this impression. 
As Grewe shows, the terms that describe the emergence of  the ‘principle of  the freedom 
to wage war’ – freies Kriegsführungsrecht, Kriegsfreiheit, liberté à guerre and compétence de 
guerre – only became customary after 1919.14 As it appears, Stephen C. Neff ’s assump-
tion that the 19th century, ‘extraordinarily, is the least explored area of  the history of  
international law’ is particularly true with respect to the justification of  war.15 A differ-
entiated analysis of  the normative status of  war in international legal discourse is absent 
not only in classical works like Grewe’s Epochs but also in more recent treatises.
Although offering one of  the most detailed treatises on the subject in contemporary 
discourse, Grewe primarily cites contemporary authors and research literature, which 
9 See the differentiating analysis of  Kunz, ‘Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale’, 45 American Journal of  
International Law (AJIL) (1951) 528; Brownlie, supra note 6, at 19; Q. Wright, A Study of  War (2nd edn, 
1965), at 685ff; Grewe, supra note 7, at 530ff; K.H. Ziegler, Völkerrechtsgeschichte (1994), at 230; Neff, 
supra note 3, at 197; Peters and Peter, ‘Lehren vom “gerechten Krieg” aus völkerrechtlicher Sicht’, 
in G.  Kreis (ed.), Der ‘gerechte Krieg’: Zur Geschichte einer aktuellen Denkfigur (2006) 43; B.  Buzan and 
G. Lawson, The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of  International Relations (2015), 
at 86; C. Chinkin and M. Kaldor, International Law and New Wars (2017), at 133.
10 J. von Elbe, ‘The Evolution of  the Concept of  the Just War in International Law’, 33 AJIL 665, at 684; 
C. Bilfinger, ‘Vollendete Tatsache und Völkerrecht. Eine Studie’, 15 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches 
Recht und Völkerrecht (1953–1954) 453, at 456; Miller, ‘The Contemporary Significance of  the Doctrine 
of  Just War’, 16 World Politics (1964) 254, at 259; Brock, supra note 3, at 20; Lesaffer, supra note 3, at 44.
11 Carty, ‘The Evolution of  International Legal Scholarship in Germany during the Kaiserreich and the 
Weimarer Republik (1871–1933)’, 50 German Yearbook of  International Law (2007) 29, at 45–55; 
M.-E. O’Connell, The Power and Purpose of  International Law: Insights from the Theory and Practice of  
Enforcement (2008), at 38–40; Simon, ‘Über das “freie Recht zum Krieg” in Politik und Völkerrecht des 
19. Jahrhunderts’ (Public lecture, Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, Frankfurt, Germany, 
2010); Verdebout, ‘The Contemporary Discourse on the Use of  Force in the Nineteenth Century: 
A Diachronic and Critical Analysis’, 1 Journal on the Use of  Force and International Law (2014) 223; See 
already Nussbaum, ‘Just War: A Legal Concept?’, 43 Michigan Law Review (1943) 453, at 474.
12 Neff, supra note 3, at 277.
13 Lesaffer, supra note 3, at 46.
14 Grewe, supra note 7, at 531.
15 Neff, ‘A Short History of  International Law’, in M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law (4th edn, 2014), at 12. 
In a similar vein, an ‘absence of  the 19th century’ in the discipline of  international relations has been 
criticized by Buzan and Lawson, supra note 9.
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seem to support his thesis of  a free right to wage war in the 19th century. Of  partic-
ular importance in Grewe’s presentation of  liberum ius ad bellum, which, according 
to him, was of  continental origin, is German lawyer Karl Lueder (1834–1895), who 
‘rejected the qualification of  war as a means of  legal appeal’.16 Grewe briefly mentions 
a second group of  authors who understood war as ‘a procedure which was provided 
for and regulated by international law for the enforcement of  legally protected claims 
and interests’.17 However, according to Grewe, neither they nor Anglo-American 
interpretations of  bellum iustum theories made a ‘substantive difference to the freedom 
to wage war’.18
A more differentiated view on the 19th-century discussion of  war has been offered 
by Neff. Neff  identifies remnants of  just war thinking in the ideas of  Johann Caspar 
Bluntschli (1808–1881), H.W. Halleck (1815–1872) and Traver Twiss (1809–1897) 
but, to Neff, just war principles were ‘somewhat disembodied’ and replaced by the 
‘positivist synthesis’ of  the ‘laissez-faire era’ in international politics.19 ‘War was now 
forthrightly seen as an instrument for the advancement of  rival national interests’, 
writes Neff: ‘The idea of  law governing the resort to war – the ius ad bellum of  lawyers – 
shrivelled into virtual nothingness in the face of  the positivist challenge. The decision 
to resort to war … was the prerogative of  policy, not of  law.’20
While Grewe and his followers identify dissident voices, they marginalize the dis-
cursive importance of  bellum iustum and the criticism of  war in 19th-century legal 
discourse. Thus, the acceptance of  liberum ius ad bellum takes the place of  a deeper 
analysis of  contemporary legal thinking, while dissenting histories are silenced. 
As becomes obvious, a detailed study of  the so-called liberum ius ad bellum and the 
im portance of  bellum iustum in the 19th century is missing, raising the question: 
how far is this basic assumption of  Grewe and his followers true or false? In what 
follows, Grewe’s thesis will be contested by a detailed look at the relevance of  bellum 
iustum and ius ad bellum in 19th-century international legal discourse. Therefore, 
the continuous connection between moral, political and legal narratives regarding 
the resort to war in 19th-century international legal doctrine will be thoroughly 
investigated, and concepts of  political legitimations of  war, attempts at the legal pre-
vention of  war and existing approaches of  bellum iustum in the so-called ‘positive 
century’ will be confronted.21
To anticipate the findings of  my comparative analysis, let me indicate that there 
are some convincing arguments in favour of  Grewe’s thesis that liberum ius ad bel-
lum existed. As Grewe suggests, this thesis was widespread in German legal doctrine 
after the German unification in 1871. It was held by authors who argued in a realist 
tradition, here described as Clausewitzian. Thus, one focus will be on German legal 
16 Grewe, supra note 7, at 532ff.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., at 533.
19 Neff, supra note 3, at 161, 168.
20 Ibid., at 161, 162.
21 Neff, supra note 3, at 215; A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of  the Law of  Nations (2nd edn, 1954), at 232, 
257.
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discourse in the late 19th century. Nevertheless, the seeming confirmation of  the 
thesis of  liberum ius ad bellum should not obscure another contemporary legal theory: 
the legal doctrine of  those scholars who were in favour of  a legal prohibition of  war. 
Both strands of  thought drew from contrary concepts of  law (positivistic versus nat-
ural law concepts).
Moreover it will be illustrated that the analytical combination of  contemporary 
legal theory and political practice may enrich the debate in the sense of  a critical legal 
history of  the politics of  justifying war.22 An analysis of  the role of  law in 19th-cen-
tury war discourses of  state practice is missing so far, but it may be decisive for the 
theoretical debate between Clausewitzians and Kantians. The fundamental argument 
of  the article, therefore, is that the justification of  war in 19th-century legal doctrine 
and state practice has to be investigated more carefully than before. The present article 
contributes to this task. It posits that the so-called liberum ius ad bellum constitutes a 
myth of  international legal doctrine.
2 The Dialectics of  a Normative Dichotomy: War and Peace 
in 19th-Century Legal Discourse
In terms of  ‘war’ and ‘peace’, the 19th century was a century of  great ambivalence, 
shaped by normative paradoxes. It has been argued that the 19th century was the 
most peaceful century in modern European history.23 In fact, between 1815 and 1914 
only five wars between great powers took place. The Congress of  Vienna (1814–1815) 
sounded the bell for a century of  political cooperation via congresses, conferences and 
multilateral diplomacy.24 The legal institute of  ‘neutrality’ appears to simultaneously 
support the findings that war had become a political affair beyond general community 
interests, on the one hand, and the idea of  an establishment of  international peace 
through law, on the other.25 However, the ‘long peace’ between the European great 
powers in the 19th century26 was by no means a non-violent order.27 Rather, it was 
a precarious armistice between the great powers, based on their diplomatic coopera-
tion and military intervention in weaker states as well as expansion and (informal) 
22 For the role of  just war thinking in early modern state practice, see Piirimäe, ‘Just War in Theory and 
Practice: The Legitimation of  Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years War’, 45 Historical Journal (2002) 
499; Tischer, supra note 6; Lesaffer, supra note 3.
23 J. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System. 1494–1975 (1983), at 90, 138; M. Schulz, Normen und 
Praxis: Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815–1860 (2009), at 5.
24 P.W. Schroeder, The Transformation of  European Politics, 1763–1848 (1994), at vii; M.  Vec, Recht und 
Normierung in der Industriellen Revolution: Neue Strukturen der Normsetzung in Völkerrecht, staatli-
cher Gesetzgebung und gesellschaftlicher Selbstnormierung (2006), at 104; H.B. Oppenheim, System des 
Völkerrechts (1845), at 1–7.
25 M. Abbenhuis, An Age of  Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815–1914 (2014), at 45.
26 Levy, supra note 23; Schulz, supra note 23.
27 Vec, ‘From the Congress of  Vienna to the Paris Peace Treaties of  1919’, in Fassbender and Peters, supra 
note 3, 654, at 660.
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imperialism in non-European territories.28 Peace went hand in hand with military 
force, violent suppression and control.29
The paradoxes and ambivalences of  war and peace in 19th-century Europe clearly 
can be identified in contemporary political practice and legal doctrine. Both were 
divided between the aims of  preventing and, more importantly, humanizing war, 
on the one hand, and an acceptance of  war as a political instrument – an ultima 
ratio for self-help in the Hobbesian tradition – on the other hand.30 Though mostly 
ignored in the history of  international law, the legitimacy of  war became a contro-
versial dispute in contemporary legal discourse. Important intellectual resources for 
the differing theoretic evaluations were (and are) the philosophers Immanuel Kant 
(1724–1804), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) and a military theorist, 
Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831).
Both Kant and Hegel rejected the horrors of  war, but they held contrasting views on 
the value of  international law. In his proposal on ‘Perpetual Peace’, published in the 
turmoil of  the French Revolution (1795), Kant demanded complete legalization and 
institutionalization of  national, international and global human relations via positive 
law in order to overcome war with an eternal legal peace (ewiger Friede).31 He refused 
the notion of  a right to go to war because of  ‘the one-sided maxims that operate by 
means of  force’.32 Instead, Kant outlined a legal prohibition of  war (ius contra bellum) 
derived from practical reason.33
Unlike Kant, Hegel argued against the binding power of  international law. 
Highlighting the centrality of  state sovereignty, Hegel rejected Kant’s project for a 
universal perpetual peace. For Hegel, law required a power to execute it; without an 
earthly judge – a praetor – over self-sufficient states, war was part of  the right beyond 
the state (das äußere Staatsrecht) and a legitimate mechanism for dispute settlement. 
The only higher praetor in the Hegelian sense was the world spirit (Weltgeist).34
While Kant and Hegel were discussing the relationship between war and law, 
Clausewitz took another route of  argumentation. He understood war as a ‘clash be-
tween major interests that is resolved by bloodshed’ and added: ‘[T]hat is the only way 
in which it differs from other conflicts.’35 Clausewitz’s main argument was the domi-
nance of  politics with regard to war. From this perspective, war was not a question of  
legality or legitimacy but, rather, a political instrument, ‘simply the continuation of  
policy with the admixture of  other means’.36 For Clausewitz, war did not take the form 
28 J. Fisch, Die europäische Expansion und das Völkerrecht: Die Auseinandersetzungen um den Status der übersee-
ischen Gebiete vom 15. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart (1984); A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of  International Law (2005).
29 M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of  Nations: The Rise and Fall of  International Law 1870–1960 (2002), 
at 11; A. Zamoyski, Rites of  Peace: The Fall of  Napoleon and the Congress of  Vienna (2007), at 554.
30 Cf. Neff, supra note 3, at 162ff.
31 Kant, supra note 1, at 11–33.
32 Ibid., at 99.
33 Cf. Habermas, ‘Kant’s Idea of  Perpetual Peace, with the Benefit of  Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight’, in 
J. Bohman and M. Lutz-Bachmann (eds), Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal (1997) 113.
34 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of  Right (1820 [2002]), at 262–264.
35 Clausewitz, supra note 2, at 146.
36 Ibid., at 69, 605; Cf. Neff, supra note 3, at 162.
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of  law enforcement in the sense of  bellum iustum but, instead, was seen as ‘nothing but 
a duel on a larger scale’ – ‘an act of  [physical, HS] force’.37
In 19th-century legal discourse, the impact of  these different perspectives on peace 
and war can be identified clearly. Legal opinions diverged sharply. Russian crown 
jurist Fedor Fedorovich Martens (1845–1909) aptly described the range of  norma-
tive judgments in modern war discourses expressed by philosophers (he mentioned 
Baruch Spinoza, Kant, Joseph de Maistre, John Stuart Mill, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 
Théophile Funck-Brentano, Adolf  Lasson), lawyers (Robert Phillimore and him-
self), military authors (Clausewitz, Wilhelm Rüstow, Gustav Ratzenhofer, Julius von 
Hartmann), political publicists (Richard Cobden, Heinrich W. Wiskemann, Heinrich 
Treitschke, Carlo Fiorilli) and a journalist (Émile de Girardin) as follows: ‘Everyone 
knows what war is, but it is clearly not easy to define it scientifically. Former definitions 
show greatest variations.’38
In fact, a precise scientific definition was not easily achieved in 19th-century legal 
theory, even if  the current omnipresence of  Grewe’s thesis of  liberum ius ad bellum 
may let one think differently. What was virtually unambiguous was the definition of  
the sovereign, ‘civilized’ (that is, European) state as the primary subject of  war, even 
if  some exceptions were considered.39 Nevertheless – and this is a basic argument of  
the present article – the normative evaluation of  war was controversially discussed 
among legal scholars. Superficially, their opinions can be categorized into two com-
peting viewpoints distinguished by legal and political perspectives: first, ‘war’ as law 
enforcement in the broader sense of  bellum iustum and, second, ‘war’ as an armed duel 
between sovereign states in the sense of  liberum ius ad bellum.
Some international lawyers defined ‘war’ in the style of  Clausewitz, as a natural 
force, which often occurs as a political instrument – Fortsetzung der Politik in anderer 
Form – as German lawyer Karl Lueder (1834–1895) expressed it.40 For Lueder, war 
was an empirical fact of  physical force.41 He therefore rejected any definition of  war as 
a legal term. This Clausewitzian school of  thought among lawyers evolved particularly 
in Imperial Germany, where some jurists were in close proximity to the military. After 
German unification in 1870–1871, German lawyers felt the pressure to combine the 
new geopolitical power of  the Kaiserreich under Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) with 
international legal obligations. In this context, the idea of  the will of  the state became 
an important narrative.42
37 Clausewitz, supra note 2, at 75; Cf. Tashjean, ‘The Clausewitzian Definition: From Just War to the Duel of  
States’, 17 Revue européenne des sciences sociales (1979) 79, at 81.
38 F. von Martens, Völkerrecht: Das internationale Recht der civilisirten Nationen, vol. 2 (2nd edn, 1886), at 476 
(my translation).
39 J.C. Bluntschli, Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilisierten Staaten als Rechtsbuch dargestellt (1868), at 287.
40 Lueder, ‘Krieg und Kriegsrecht im Allgemeinen’, in F. von Holtzendorff  (ed.), Handbuch des Völkerrechts 
(1889) 169, at 180; see also Ullmann, ‘Völkerrecht’, in E. Ullmann (ed.), Handbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts 
(2nd edn, 1898), at 313; R.R. Foulke, A Treatise on International Law (1920), at 130ff. Lueder also quoted 
W. Rüstow, Die Feldherrnkunst des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts: Zum Selbststudium und für den Unterricht an 
höheren Militärschulen (1857), at 1.
41 Lueder, supra note 40, at 180–184.
42 Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 29, at 204ff.
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War was understood as a historical constant, which in spite of  its brutality and 
terror had the meaning of  an exponent of  progress, a necessary instrument for the 
further development of  civilization – ein wahrer nothwendiger Culturträger.43 War was 
consequently the normal condition of  international relations, which was in har-
mony with ‘divine order’ (göttliche Weltordnung). It was not only a law of  the world 
(Weltgesetz) – here one may suspect the impact of  Hegel – but also a political instru-
ment to gain national honour, power and the independence of  the sovereign state in 
its own right – here, one can clearly see the impact of  Clausewitz.44
However, these realistic views on the historical dialectics of  war and order were 
by no means simply taken for granted in legal discourse, as Grewe and his followers 
claim. On the contrary, they were challenged by liberal lawyers, who were in favour 
of  a legal prohibition of  war.45 Legal authorities like the famous Swiss lawyer Johann 
Caspar Bluntschli, a co-founder of  the (Nobel Peace Prize winning) Institut de Droit 
International, as well as Henry Bonfils (1835–1897), a professor in Toulouse who 
considered war a scandal because of  its inhuman brutality. Following Bonfils, war, 
conducted for whatever reason, was an evil. Even justified wars were therefore morally 
reprehensible.46 From these moral scruples, Bluntschli, Bonfils and others concluded 
in normative opposition to Lueder and his colleagues that peace was the normal condi-
tion of  international relations.47 In times of  peace, assumed Bluntschli, law ruled, not 
force.48 While the Clausewitzians took war for granted, liberal lawyers like Bluntschli 
believed in the possibility of  international peace through law.
Still one can find a curious paradox in Bluntschli’s treatise regarding the dialec-
tics of  war and order. Citing Friedrich Schiller’s (1759–1805) ‘Die Weltgeschichte ist 
das Weltgericht’ (‘World History Is the World’s Tribunal’) from the poem ‘Resignation’ 
(1786), Bluntschli admitted that under the existing natural conditions and an inex-
orable desire to overcome outdated law, war could sometimes be seen as an irresistible 
necessity.49 Being a supporter of  Bismarck’s unification policy,50 Bluntschli argued in 
favour of  the ‘holy, natural and important right’ of  a Volk to national unity; even if  
this ‘natural right’ required a resort to violence.51 Bluntschli’s argument was based on 
legal, not power-political or military progress; however, some form of  a dialectic under-
standing of  the relationship between war and order was present both in Clausewitzian 
and liberal legal thought. Peace and war were seen as being historically interwoven.
43 Lueder, supra note 40, at 203.
44 Ibid.
45 Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 29; Vec, supra note 27.
46 H. Bonfils, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts: Für Studium und Praxis (3rd edn, 1904), at 538ff.
47 Rotteck, ‘Krieg’, in C.  von Rotteck and C.  Welcker (eds), Staatslexikon oder Enzyklopädie der 
Staatswissenschaften (1840) 491, at 492; Bluntschli, supra note 39, at 9; Bonfils, supra note 46, at 538; 
D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of  International Law: Designed as an Aid in Teaching, and in Historical 
Studies (1879 [2003]), at 183; L. Strisower, Krieg und Völkerrechtsordnung (1919), at 4.
48 Bluntschli, supra note 39, at 9.
49 Ibid., at 10; Schiller, ‘Resignation’, 2 Thalia (1786) 64.
50 Koskenniemi, supra note 29, at 64.
51 Bluntschli, supra note 39, at 291.
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Bluntschli and his followers’ scandalization of  war was taken up and heavily 
criticized by some contemporary legal scholars. Many of  the lawyers, who criticized 
Bluntschli, could be labelled as Clausewitzians: ‘War is fighting, and there is noth-
ing abnormal about a fighting man, so why should men fighting in a body be ab-
normal?’, wrote American lawyer Roland R[oberts] Foulke from Philadelphia.52 For 
Clausewitzians, war was a fact, not an object for philosophical reflections. Referring to 
Kant and liberal lawyers, Karl Lueder argued that the realization of  perpetual peace 
was unthinkable and impossible. For him, it was ein unerreichbares Ideal – and not even 
the right ideal at all – because war was natural and necessary.53 These were realists’ 
answers to the liberal project of  a legal prohibition of  war, favouring a turn from the 
universal vocabulary of  justice to the empirical facts of  history.
To sum up, within the legal discourse, there were contradicting voices concerning 
the status of  war in history. Some judged it morally evil in the Kantian sense, others 
legitimated it as the normal – indeed, honourable – procedure of  international rela-
tions in a Hobbesian or Clausewitzian sense. Consequently, it is possible to identify 
competing normative arguments derived from political, legal and moral spheres in 
the treatment of  war in 19th-century legal discourse, which make it plausible to use 
the term of  ‘multi-normativity’ in this topic area.54 Based on these research results, 
the next section will unveil the impact of  these different normative statements on the 
question of  a legitimate or legal use of  force in international relations – that is, the 
dualism of  liberum ius ad bellum in the sense of  war as a political duel and just war 
thinking (bellum iustum) in contemporary legal discourse. As will be shown, a pas-
sionate dispute arose around the legitimacy of  war in 19th-century legal doctrine, 
especially after 1870, as both legal positivism and natural law thinking were faced 
with a particularly poorly regulated policy field. Did lawyers claim liberum ius ad bellum 
within this framework?
3 Multiple Justifications of  War: Bellum iustum, ius ad 
bellum and ius contra bellum in 19th-Century Legal 
Discourse
Whereas war had been a central topic in every treatise of  international law, there were 
hardly any comprehensive or concluding investigations of  the legitimacy of  resort to 
war in 19th-century legal doctrine. This is an observation I share with German lawyer 
Heinrich Rettich. In 1888, Rettich criticized contemporary international lawyers for 
not having come up with a widely shared positivist understanding of  war and its func-
tions in history. As the former chapter has revealed, Rettich’s argument had some 
plausibility. However, even more unsatisfying – bei manchen höchst unklar und unlogisch, 
52 Foulke, supra note 40.
53 Lueder, supra note 40, at 196–199, 203.
54 Vec, ‘Multinormativität in der Rechtsgeschichte’, in Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften 
(vormals Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften) Jahrbuch 2008 (2009) 155, at 162–165.
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as Rettich wrote polemically – was the scientific treatment of  the justifying causes of  
war – die Lehre von den rechtfertigenden Kriegsursachen.55 From his overview of  19th-
century international legal discourse, Rettich argued, in accordance with Grewe’s 
thesis of  liberum ius ad bellum, that there was a positive right to wage war – ein Recht 
zum Kriege – based on a state’s interests and necessities.56 However, at this point, my 
agreement with Rettich ends.
In fact, there was a respectable group of  lawyers in the 19th century who understood 
war as a legally irrelevant, but valid, political instrument. They thereby supported the 
idea of  the free right of  the state to go to war as the acme of  state sovereignty.57 For 
instance, Emanuel Ullmann (1841–1913), former professor of  public and criminal 
law in Vienna and successor of  Franz von Holtzendorff  (1829–1889) in Munich from 
1889, argued that every war was legal because a sovereign state accepted only its own 
politics as legally significant.58 Not surprisingly, many of  these advocates of  a realist 
view on international war were the same authors who had already argued in favour 
of  the civilizing and regulative value of  war in history. German lawyer Paul Heilborn 
(1861–1932) agreed with Ullmann by characterizing war as ‘absolutely permitted 
in inter-State relations’.59 In treatises of  jurists such as Heilborn and Ullmann, there-
fore, one can identify contemporary sources for Grewe’s thesis of  a free right to wage 
war. How was this liberum ius ad bellum reasoned in Clausewitzian international legal 
theory?
One of  the most precise descriptions of  war in the sense of  the Clausewitzian state 
duel was given by John Westlake (1828–1913), then professor for international law 
at Cambridge University in England.60 Westlake argued that a war between ‘civilized 
states’ was begun because of  some demand or some complaint of  one state against 
another. Still, for Westlake, when it came to the legitimacy of  war, international law 
‘says its last word on that point when it pronounces the demand or the complaint to 
be legitimate or illegitimate, and if  possible, offers arbitration’.61 However, on a second 
level, he argued that the question of  the legitimacy of  war could be put aside if  states 
were not content with peaceful conflict offered by international law: ‘[T]he want of  
organisation in the world of  states compels the law which was concerned with their 
dispute to stand aside while they fight the quarrel out, in obedience not to the natural 
law of  philosophers, which is a rule prescribing conduct, but to that of  the natural 
historian, which is a record of  the habits of  the species, good or bad.’62
55 H. Rettich, Zur Theorie und Geschichte des Rechts zum Kriege (1888), at 39, 67.
56 Ibid., at xiii.
57 C. Gareis, Institutionen des Völkerrechts (1888), at 192; especially Lueder, supra note 40, at 179ff; Ullman, 
supra note 40, at 313; P. Heilborn, Handbuch des Völkerrechts (1912), vol. 1, at 23; A. Quaritsch, Völkerrecht 
und Auswärtige Politik (9th edn, 1913), at 150ff; J. Westlake, International Law, vol. 2: War (1907), at 1; 
K. Strupp, Grundzüge des positiven Völkerrechts (4th edn, 1928), at 212; L. Oppenheim, International Law: 
A Treatise (3rd edn, 1921), at 79ff; A. Lasson, Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts (1871), at 68.
58 Ullmann, supra note 40, at 313.
59 Heilborn, supra note 57, at 23.
60 Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 29, at 86.
61 Westlake, supra note 57, at 56.
62 Ibid.
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Three aspects of  Westlake’s definition of  war between states make it a particularly 
interesting summary of  the Clausewitzian approach. First, there is the assumption 
that two states could jointly decide to ignore questions of  the legitimacy of  war in order 
to solve their ‘quarrel’ by resorting to armed force instead. For Clausewitzians, war 
became a duel between two states over opposing political interests. Like Clausewitz, 
Lueder and Alphonse Rivier (1835–1898) argued that the definition of  ‘war’ presup-
posed violent acts on both sides.63 Here, one may remember Clausewitz’s famous def-
inition of  the beginning of  a state duel: ‘War begins only with defence’ (‘Der Krieg 
beginnt mit der Verteidigung’).64
Second, there was the claim that international law was to ‘stand aside’ during a 
duel, as argued by Westlake. The normative power of  right was to be subordinated to 
factual might. The legitimacy of  war was to be ignored since, for Clausewitzians, war 
was not law enforcement but, instead, each belligerent simply strove ‘to break down 
the resistance of  the other to the terms which he requires for peace’.65 This definition 
clearly goes beyond the concept of  war that is limited to sanctions in the sense of  bel-
lum iustum. Wars were not necessarily limited ‘to the concession of  the demand or the 
satisfaction of  the complaint out of  which the war arose’ but, rather, could include 
cession of  territory or even the extinction of  the weaker state by conquest.66
For Clausewitzians, normative limitations in the sense of  just war theory and, with 
it, the very idea of  justice with respect to war were parts of  the past and belonged to 
the medieval bellum iustum theory. According to them, states had never differentiated 
between just and unjust war in the legal sense; the distinction thus had no effect on 
the fact of  war.67 Where sovereign states decided to fight a duel, law could not prevent 
them from seeing war as a necessity. Thus, the concept of  ‘military necessity’ took the 
discursive place of  morality and law. As we can clearly reconstruct, Clausewitzians 
declined the just war doctrine as being incompatible with a political, demoralized 
‘right of  the stronger’. In order to avoid a regulation of  the ‘necessity of  war’, these 
lawyers denied the theory of  bellum iustum as well as the positivistic legalization of  war 
(ius contra bellum). For them, the ius ad bellum was, exactly as Kant had criticized it in 
1795, a prerogative of  sovereignty.68 Law was seen as providing mitigating rules; thus, 
only the ius in bello was accepted as legally binding by Clausewitzians.69 However, in 
the German Kaiserreich, lawyers like pro-military Lueder and Ullmann were particu-
larly taken with the idea of  a selective use of  the normative force of  ius in bello in light 
of  military needs70 – Kriegsräson geht vor Kriegsrecht (the raison of  war overrides the 
laws of  war).71
63 Lueder, supra note 40, at 175ff; A. Rivier, Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts (1889), at 378.
64 C. von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (1832 [1980]), at 644.
65 Westlake, supra note 57, at 57; Lueder, supra note 40, at 176.
66 Westlake, supra note 57, at 57.
67 Ibid.; Strupp, supra note 57, at 211ff.
68 Kant, supra note 1, at 99.
69 Strupp, supra note 57, at 211ff.
70 Lueder, supra note 40, at 186ff; Rivier, supra note 63, at 376; Ullmann, supra note 40, at 317.
71 I.V. Hull, A Scrap of  Paper: Breaking and Making International Law during the Great War (2014), at 211–239.
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Third, the Clausewitzians’ neglect of  the legitimacy of  war as well as their denial of  
bellum iustum was clearly based on a purely positivist-empirical concept of  law. It fell on 
fertile ground in the German context after 1870–1871, when international lawyers 
forged ahead with the transformation of  their science into positivism. Here, the claim 
for liberum ius ad bellum was particularly strong. Some parts of  German legal doctrine 
were shaped by a turn to a sociological language, which can be identified in Ullmann’s 
Völkerrecht.72 Clausewitzian lawyers argued in favour of  war as a physical fact – a lex 
lata naturae – which was not to be judged normatively.73 The just war doctrine was to 
be overcome. In Clausewitzian positivism, bellum iustum was an outdated natural law 
conception. In contrast to the ‘natural law of  philosophers’, Clausewitzians only ac-
cepted empirically demonstrable, as well as enforceable, law as ‘true law’: ‘[T]hat of  
the natural historian, which is a record of  the habits of  the species, good or bad.’74 For 
them, natural law was inappropriate as a source of law.
Given the fact that there was no prohibition of  war and ‘no rule concerning when 
war may be waged’ by the second half  of  the century, it appeared to Clausewitzians 
that international law could only be enforced to a small extent.75 From their strictly fac-
tual-positivist standpoint, the legitimacy of  war was not a relevant question of  inter-
national law but, if  at all, one of  international morality.76 ‘But modern International 
Law knows nothing of  these moral questions’, argued British lawyer Thomas Joseph 
Lawrence (1849–1920), lecturer at Cambridge University in England and in Chicago 
in the USA, in his perfect summary of  this perspective on war and law: ‘It does not 
pronounce upon them: it simply ignores them. To it war, whether just or unjust, right 
or wrong, is a fact which alters in a great variety of  ways the relations of  the parties 
concerned.’77 To some extent, it was a capitulation before the ‘reality’ of war.
Does this mean that bellum iustum had been forgotten in the 19th century? Not at 
all! Whereas the discrimination between just and unjust wars was central to moral 
theological and legal writings in pre-modern Europe, the terms ‘just war’, gerechter 
Krieg and guerre juste can, interestingly enough, still be found in legal writings of  the 
19th century. The first piece of  evidence is that Clausewitzian writers felt the need 
to distance themselves from bellum iustum arguments.78 Thus, it still had a discursive 
meaning in 19th-century legal doctrine, even for Clausewitzians. In 1888, Rettich 
assumed that he was writing against a mainstream legal discourse dominated by bel-
lum iustum;79 from a genealogical perspective, Rettich’s assumption is particularly 
interesting as it strongly supports the thesis that liberum ius ad bellum was fully devel-
oped only in the last third of  the 19th century by Clausewitzians. For these lawyers, 
72 Cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 29, at 224; Carty, supra note 11, at 51.
73 Lueder, supra note 40, at 176.
74 Westlake, supra note 57, at 56.
75 Heilborn, supra note 57, at 23.
76 Lueder, supra note 40, at 182; Ullmann, supra note 40, at 313.
77 T.J. Lawrence, The Principles of  International Law (2nd edn, 1895), at 292.
78 Lueder, supra note 40, at 182, 195.
79 Rettich, supra note 55, at xiii; Cf. Carty, supra note 11, at 45.
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bellum iustum was – or, at least, should have been – replaced by liberum ius ad bellum. 
Furthermore, in their positivist outlook, bellum iustum and liberum ius ad bellum could 
not coexist as separate legal theories (that is, in the sense of  a distinction as the first 
belonging to natural law, the second to positive law). For them, a moral perspective on 
war was fully inappropriate for international law. Most importantly, as they constantly 
cited the just war tradition, it now becomes obvious that their idea of  liberum ius ad 
bellum was actually a historical modification of  the bellum iustum tradition, overcom-
ing right intention and just cause but focusing on the right authority – that is, the 
sovereign state.80 For Clausewitzian lawyers, not only was war to be freed from bellum 
iustum limitations but also, even more, liberum ius ad bellum had emerged from the bel-
lum iustum theory during the early modern times.81 According to them, the pursued 
transformation from bellum iustum to liberum ius ad bellum was also a shift from nat-
ural law to a sociological positivism of  military necessity, which was finally completed 
in the last third of  the 19th century.
However, there is a second, even more striking piece of  evidence that supports the 
thesis that the just war tradition, albeit in a broader sense, still had an important 
impact on international legal theory – namely, the Clausewitzian perspective on the 
free resort to war by states was contested through moral and legal arguments derived 
from the just war theory. Before the dispute between the Clausewitzians and liberals 
reached its climax in the second half  of  the century, a well-known 19th-century law-
yer, the German August Wilhelm Heffter (1796–1880), professor of  law in Berlin, had 
already referred to a just war – gerechter Krieg – from a positivistic perspective. His Das 
Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart was praised by European lawyers as one of  the 
best legal treatises on positive international law.82 Heffter defined ‘war’ solely as the 
use of  utmost, even destructive, force in favour of  the realization of  legal purposes: 
‘Ein Rechtsbegriff  wird der Krieg erst, wenn man sich ihn als Anwendung des äußersten 
selbst vernichtenden Zwanges wider einen Andern denkt, zur Realisirung rechtlicher Zwecke 
bis zur Erreichung derselben.’83 For Heffter, who shared some similarities with Hegel, 
war was, ‘with other words’, the ultimate self-help.84
However, in accordance with many scholars with a legal background – and in total 
contrast to the definition of  war as a pure fact used by German lawyers later in the 
century, whom I call Clausewitzians – Heffter distinguished between defensive wars to 
ward off  an unjust attack and offensive wars, which were waged for the purpose of  sat-
isfaction.85 Here, Heffter identified the boundary line between war and justice – a war 
was only just to the extent that self-help was allowed.86 For Heffter, an unjust war – der 
ungerechte Krieg – was actually equal in its effects to a just war; da er, argued Heffter, 
80 Cf. Tashjean, supra note 37, at 82.
81 For early modern debates, see Neff, supra note 3, at 132–140.
82 Cf. Rivier, supra note 63, at 61; Nussbaum, supra note 21, at 243.
83 A.W. Heffter, Das Europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart (1844), at 195.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.; C. Calvo, Dictionnaire de Droit International Public et Privé (1885), at 366.
86 Heffter, supra note 83, at 196; Bluntschli, supra note 39, at 287.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-abstract/29/1/113/4993231
by Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung Bibliothek user
on 28 August 2018
126 EJIL 29 (2018), 113–136
dem gerechten thatsächlich gleichsteht.87 In an analogy to Hegel (and Alberico Gentili), 
Heffter explained this factual non-difference between just and unjust wars with the 
lack of  an earthly judge, by whom justice or injustice of  a war could be sentenced.
This contradiction between the factuality of  war and a pursued positivist interna-
tional legal order reflects the liberal challenge to integrate bellum iustum as a moral 
theory into 19th-century legal discourse; political scientist Robert von Mohl (1799–
1875), professor in Tübingen, agreed with Heffter. For him, war was ultima ratio regum 
in order to defend the law and save the international legal order from violent anarchy. 
For Mohl, the ultimate reason for war was the restoration of  law and peace.88 This was 
a definition of  war as legal enforcement, which can also be found, with even stronger 
reference to classical, moral theological concepts of  bellum iustum, in contemporary 
legal discourse on ‘measures short on war’ like ‘reprisals’89 and ‘(humanitarian) inter-
vention’.90 For Martens, an intervention could be justified in the name of  ‘interna-
tional community’, with recourse to the ‘commonality of  religious interests and the 
commandments of  humanity, that is the principles of  natural law [sic!]’.91 Thus, nat-
ural law was still alive at the end of  the 19th century. However, for liberal lawyers, 
the binding power of  law was not just limited to ‘measures short of  war’ but was also 
applied to the legal justification of war.
Robert Phillimore (1810–1885) called war a ‘terrible litigation’ between states, 
and Martens rightly acknowledged Phillimore’s legal position to be in total contra-
diction to Clausewitz’s concept of  war as a state duel.92 Other lawyers also argued 
likewise, with recourse to bellum iustum, by the second half  of  the century, when the 
Clausewitzian legal doctrine was in full bloom. Like Heffter, Bluntschli identified a war 
to be just (gerecht) if  armed self-help could be justified by international law and unjust 
(ungerecht) if  it was in contradiction with the rules of  international law: ‘Der Krieg ist 
gerecht, wenn und soweit die bewaffnete Rechtshülfe durch das Völkerrecht begründet ist, 
ungerecht, wenn dieselbe im Widerspruch mit den Vorschriften des Völkerrechts ist.’93
Argentinian lawyer Carlo (‘Charles’) Calvo (1824–1906), another co-founder of  
the Institut de Droit International, agreed in 1885 that war could be considered just 
if  international law authorized the recourse to arms, and, therefore, it could be con-
sidered unjust if  it was against the principles of  law: ‘Légitimation de la guerre: … En 
résumé, une guerre peut être considérée comme juste, lorsque le droit international autorise 
le recours aux armes; comme injuste lorsqu’elle est contraire aux principes de ce droit.’94 
And August von Bulmerincq (1822–1890) argued that a state that was harmed in its 
87 Heffter, supra note 83, at 195.
88 R. von Mohl, Encyklopädie der Staatswissenschaften (1859), at 453ff.
89 Neff, supra note 3, at 225–227.
90 For 19th-century international political theory, see Jahn, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: What’s in a 
Name?’, 49 International Politics (2012) 36.
91 F. von Martens, Völkerrecht: Das internationale Recht der civilisirten Nationen (2nd edn, 1883), vol. 1, at 
302.
92 Martens, supra note 38, at 476.
93 Bluntschli, supra note 39, at 290.
94 Calvo, supra note 85, at 366ff.
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fundamental rights by another state was justified to use war as a Rechtsmittel. To him, 
only a war waged in order to defend its right was justified: ‘Nur der Vertheidigungskrieg 
ist völkerrechtlich gerechtfertigt.’95 Moreover, in the tradition of  bellum iustum, a war 
was only legitimate for the purposes of  restoring violated rights and achieving com-
pensation; war was not a political instrument but, rather, one of  law. Therefore, re-
course to the coercive violence of  war is not justified by the Clausewitzian necessity of  
war but only by the necessity of  law (Rechtsnothwendigkeit;96 Rechtsgründe97).
For Bluntschli, it was not only a question of  morality but also an imperative of  law – 
nicht bloß ein moralischer, sondern ein wirklicher Rechtssatz.98 Legal reasons for a war, he 
argued, were (a serious threat of) infringements of  rights, trespasses against a state 
or a grave breach against the world order. Similar to early modern just war theory, 
a violation of  rights was the central criterion to Bluntschli’s legal conception of  war, 
but, in contrast to it, the causa iusta was to be legalized – in other words, to be trans-
formed into positive law. In the legal writings of  the 19th century, if  the legitimization 
of  war had been described in terms of  just and unjust, then ‘just’ or ‘unjust’ meant 
generally the same thing as ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’.99 Thus, it appears that the conception 
of  war found in Bluntschli’s treatise can be understood as an early attempt at a mod-
ern ius contra bellum, based on the idea of  peace through law.100 Here, one can see the 
influence of  Kant’s legal philosophy and his concepts of  international and global legal 
society (Völkerrecht/Weltbürgerrecht).101
Nevertheless, as Bluntschli admitted, a legal limitation of  the resort to war was, for 
the time being, of  little practical importance because there was no impartial judge to 
differ between just/legal and unjust/illegal wars.102 Since no treaty generally prohib-
ited war, Bluntschli understood that there was a long way to go for international law 
to transform violent international conflicts (violentia) into truly legal conflicts (potes-
tas). The early modern question ‘quis iudicabit?’ was still lacking an answer in positiv-
istic terms, and, along with it, the theoretical and methodical problems of  the concept 
and sources of  international law had arisen. In contrast to the Clausewitzians, who 
turned (and surrendered) to the sociological-empirical ‘factuality’ of  war, liberal law-
yers did not take the lack of  a positivist legalization as immutable. Bluntschli and his 
followers therefore combined two normative spheres in their criticism of  war as a po-
litical instrument: law and morality. Bluntschli argued that it was in the interest of  
humanity (großes humanes Interesse) to outlaw the ‘barbaric view’ of  war (barbarischen 
Standpunkt) as violent self-help in the sense of  the medieval feud.103 For Bluntschli, a 
95 A. von Bulmerincq, Das Völkerrecht oder das internationale Recht (2nd edn, 1889), at 357; cf. Carty, supra 
note 11, at 49.
96 Bulmerincq, supra note 95, at 357.
97 Bluntschli, supra note 39, at 290.
98 Ibid.
99 Rivier, supra note 63, at 361.
100 Bluntschli, supra note 39, at 287ff.
101 Ibid., at 26ff; cf. Koskenniemi, supra note 29, at 50; B. Stråth, Europe’s Utopias of  Peace: 1815, 1919, 1951 
(2016), at 194ff.
102 Bluntschli, supra note 39, at 26.
103 Ibid., at 288.
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-abstract/29/1/113/4993231
by Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung Bibliothek user
on 28 August 2018
128 EJIL 29 (2018), 113–136
prohibition of  war was a legal and moral imperative for the civilizing progress of  the 
international normative order.
The combination of  moral and legal arguments on which these early concepts of  
modern ius contra bellum were founded resulted in a debate about legal methodol-
ogy. German lawyer Carl Gareis (1844–1923), a lecturer in Königsberg and Munich, 
wrote in 1888 that Bluntschli had spoken de lege ferenda – about the law to be – not de 
lege lata – about the current law.104 This was a critique similar to the more general one 
of  English legal theorist John Austin (1790–1859), for whom law was the sovereign’s 
command backed by a sanction. Since international law lacked a reliable enforcement 
system, for Austin, it was not law but, rather, ‘positive morality’.105 These consider-
ations were widespread in Clausewitzian theory. Similar to Gareis, Rettich in 1888 
criticized Heffter, Bluntschli and Bulmerincq for their views on war as law enforce-
ment; to Rettich, Blumerincq’s argument, drawing from the bellum iustum tradition, 
was ‘pure philosophy’ based on natural law thinking and, therefore, technically inap-
propriate in a legal sense.106
On the contrary, lawyers like Bluntschli and Bulmerincq were influenced by the his-
torical school of  law of  Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1861). Admiring Savigny’s 
‘supra-national historicism’,107 international law for liberals was a narrative of  
human progress and of  ‘moral and civilizing forces’.108 In contrast to Austin’s com-
mand theory, liberals founded their concept of  law not on enforceability but, rather, 
on ‘historical jurisprudence, linked with liberal-humanitarian ideals and theories of  
natural evolution of  European societies’.109 It was not primarily to be derived from con-
tracts but, instead, from the ‘legal conscience of  the civilized world’.110 Consequently, 
Bluntschli referred to the concepts of  ‘law to come’ (werdendes Recht) and ‘living law’ 
(lebendiges Recht).111
While the Clausewitzians’ positivism referred to absolute sociological-empirical ‘fac-
ticity’ and was thus in strong contrast to natural law, for liberal idealists like Bluntschli 
and other members of  the Institut de Droit International (the ‘men of  1873’), positive 
law was part of  law as a ‘living institution’,112 an ‘empirical underpinning’ that had to 
be developed from the ‘overall world view’ of  natural law.113 Since there was not (yet) 
a legal sanction for unjustified wars in positivistic terms, the Clausewitzian theory of  
‘law’ that was derived from absolute sovereignty led to liberum ius ad bellum. In con-
trast, liberal legal doctrine based on the concept of  an international community – that 
104 C. Gareis, Institutionen des Völkerrechts (1888), at 37.
105 O’Connell, supra note 11, at 40.
106 Rettich, supra note 55, at 49; cf. Carty, supra note 11, at 46.
107 Koskenniemi, supra note 29, at 45.
108 Koskenniemi, ‘The Legacy of  the Nineteenth Century’, in D.  Armstrong (ed.), Routledge Handbook of  
International Law (2009) 141, at 147.
109 Koskenniemi, supra note 29, at 51.
110 Ibid.; cf. Bluntschli, supra note 39, at vi.
111 Bluntschli, supra note 39, at viff.
112 Cf. ibid.; Koskenniemi, supra note 29, at 51.
113 Stråth, supra note 101, at 194.
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is, common European values, traditions and norms – led to the theories of  bellum ius-
tum and to natural law. Different spheres of  normativity were still highly interwoven 
in the last third of  the ‘positive century’.114 Natural law thinking still played a strong 
role in parts of  international legal doctrine, even in the German Kaiserreich,115 where 
Clausewitzian thinking was particularly strong.
Thus, in view of  the justification of  military force, the 19th century was a century 
of  ‘multi-normativity’.116 Two international legal viewpoints evolved in the second 
half  of  the century that did not simply coexist but, rather, referred to each other and, 
thereby, proved to be irreconcilable. In this methodological dispute between ‘realists’ 
and ‘moralists’, authors like Carl Bergbohm (1849–1927) saw a serious difficulty for 
the creation of  a formal international law, based on the self-legislation of  states.117 For 
both sides, the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871) constituted a caesura; the German 
Kaiserreich became a fruitful context for Clausewitzian conceptions of  law. However, 
the brutality of  the war also confirmed ‘the men of  1873’ in their belief  that peace 
through law was necessary.118 For Clausewitzians, war was simply a fact – Fortsetzung 
der Politik mit anderen Mitteln – that was permitted at all times.119 Kantian scholars 
understood that such a right to go to war was ‘equivalent to a Right to determine what 
is just not by universal external laws limiting the freedom of  every individual alike, 
but through one-sided maxims that operate by means of  force’. Therefore, it could not 
‘be properly conceived as an element in the Right of  Nations’.120 While the existence 
of  this dualism already does question the thesis of  liberum ius ad bellum, a decision on 
whether Clausewitzian realists or Kantian idealists offered the more adequate inter-
national legal doctrine cannot easily be made. A look at the justification discourses in 
political practice, however cursory, may help to tackle this problem.
4 Between Might and Right: The Politics of  Justifying War 
in 19th-Century State Practice
When examining the practical proximity of  legal war theories in the 19th century, 
some fundamental challenges arise. Both concepts of  ‘war’ in international legal 
doctrine – as a Clausewitzian duel and as legal enforcement – were theoretical con-
structions – ‘ideal types’ (Idealtypen), to borrow the terminology of  Max Weber (1864–
1920). As such, they can only capture to some extent the historical ‘reality’ of  warfare 
114 Neff, supra note 3, at 215; cf. Vec, ‘Sources in the 19th Century European Tradition: The Myth of  
Positivism’, in S. Besson and J. d’Aspremont (eds), Oxford Handbook on the Sources of  International Law 
(2017) 121.
115 Cf. Carty, supra note 11, at 49.
116 Vec, supra note 54.
117 C. Bergbohm, Staatsverträge und Gesetze als Quellen des Völkerrechts (1876), at 7.
118 Koskenniemi, supra note 29, at 12–19; Stråth, supra note 101, at 194.
119 Lueder, supra note 40, at 180.
120 Kant, supra note 1, at 99.
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and, even less, the ‘real’ motives of  the war parties. This problem is reinforced by the 
fact that the empirical material – that is, the number of  wars in the (European) 19th 
century – is limited. ‘History’, as Neff  has put it correctly, ‘is no subject for purists’.121
A war that most likely would feature as a duel may be the Austro-Prussian War 
(1866). It was waged with a precise political goal (a decision on the process of  German 
unification); furthermore, the war’s outcome resulted largely from a decisive battle 
near Königgrätz on 3 July 1866.122 Helmuth Graf  von Moltke (1800–1891), Prussian 
chief  of  the general staff  and a disciple of  Clausewitz, thus saw in it the ideal of  a 
cabinet war, defined by limited, short and decisive fighting as well as by the absence 
of  ideological public debates.123 However, even if  one accepts the 1866 war as a 
Clausewitzian state duel, it appears to be an exception to the rule – both with regard to 
19th-century warfare as well as to war discourse (there were no official declarations 
of  war in 1866).
However, it is highly problematic to apply the duel concept to the next war – the 
Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871). The Franco-Prussian War can be understood as 
a hybrid war between the 18th-century ‘cabinet wars’ and the 20th-century ‘total 
wars’. Analogously to the 1866 war, this war began with a limited goal (preventing 
or fulfilling German unification), but after the French defeat at Sedan, it was trans-
formed into an industrialized ‘people’s war’, shaped by public nationalism, violence 
against civilians and partisan attacks against the Prussian invaders performed by 
Francs-tireurs.124 Moltke, in turn, denied the Francs-tireurs the status of  combatants 
and ordered summary executions.125 In fact, the Franco-Prussian War pointed to the 
end of  the duel war in the Clausewitzian sense as well as to the rise of  total war. ‘The 
age of  cabinet’s war is behind us, – now we have only people’s war’, Moltke would 
express in his last speech in the Reichstag on 14 May 1890.126
Furthermore, and clearly against the thesis of  liberum ius ad bellum, the Franco-
Prussian War was accompanied by discourses on its legitimacy both in domestic and 
foreign arenas. Public opinion had quite literally urged the French government to 
declare war against Prussia in 1870 after Bismarck had intentionally provoked it by 
shortening the Emser Depesche (making the French believe that King Wilhelm I had 
harshly rejected the demand for a further renunciation of  a Hohenzollern candidate 
for the Spanish throne).127 The war was not only an instrument of  sovereign policy 
121 Neff, supra note 3, at 164.
122 Cf. ibid.; J. Leonhard, Die Büchse der Pandora: Geschichte des Ersten Weltkrieges (2014), at 30.
123 Leonhard, supra note 122, at 30.
124 Förster, ‘Facing “People’s War”: Moltke the Elder and Germany’s Military Options after 1871’, 10 Journal 
of  Strategic Studies (1987) 209, at 209.
125 Leonhard, supra note 122, at 30ff.
126 S. Förster and J. Nagler (eds), On the Road to Total War: The American War and the German Wars of  Unification, 
1861–1871 (1997), at 1. It should be noted here that Clausewitz was the first to analyse the mobiliza-
tion of  the people in the context of  the French Revolutionary Wars. Cf. Förster, ‘The Prussian Triangle of  
Leadership in the Face of  a People’s War: A Reassessment of  the Conflict between Bismarck and Moltke, 
1870–71’, in ibid., at 118.
127 Cf. Neff, supra note 3, at 164.
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but also depended on public legitimacy. Napoleon III was correct to note in his speech 
of  21 July 1870 that it was ‘the whole nation which has, by its irresistible impulse, 
dictated our decisions [to go to war]’.128
France considered it necessary to stress that it was not waging a war out of  politi-
cal ambitions but, rather, that it was ‘a war of  equilibrium’ – a ‘defence of  the weak 
against the strong, the reparation of  great iniquities, the chastisement of  unjustifiable 
acts’.129 Thus, Napoleon III (1808–1873) literally emphasized the ‘just cause’ of  his 
‘defence’ against ‘Prussian egotism’, upon which Europe should pronounce – a prime 
example of  the justifications for 19th-century bellum iustum doctrine!130 Even though 
Clausewitzian lawyers claimed an unlimited sovereign right to go to war, justifications 
in state practice spoke a different language, pointing at international peace, stability 
and the preservation of  national rights. Echoing these sentiments, the French official 
account of  the origin of  the war held ‘that the rights of  each nation, like the rights of  
each individual, are limited by the rights of  others, and it is not permissible [sic] that 
one nation, under the pretext of  exercising its own sovereignty, should menace the 
existence or the security of  a neighbouring nation’.131 Military necessity was denied 
status as a just cause of  war. Here, one can find a clear rejection of  any notion of  libe-
rum ius ad bellum.
Discursive legitimacy was also important for Bismarck, who had waited for the 
French declaration of  war (19 July 1870) in order to make France appear to be the 
aggressor: ‘The whole civilised world will acknowledge that the grounds for war 
assigned by France do not exist, and are nothing but pretence and invention.’ Bismarck 
wrote this the very same day, and he added that both the North German Confederation 
and the allied governments of  the South German states would defend the ‘unpro-
voked attack’ (nicht provocierten Ueberfall) with all the means that ‘[p]rovidence has 
placed at their disposal’.132 Bismarck had successfully generated national and inter-
national sympathy for Prussia and its war aims. However, this changed immediately 
when Prussia decided to annex parts of  Alsace and Lorraine after its decisive victory 
at Sedan (1 September 1870).133 As can be seen, in 19th-century war discourse, not 
only was publicity of  the utmost importance, but an unlimited freedom to conquer 
another state’s territory was also seen as illegitimate, although it was permitted in 
Clausewitzian legal scholarship.
Contrary to the thesis of  liberum ius ad bellum, we observe a communicative prac-
tice of  constantly justifying the use of  force during the entire century.134 In his re-
alist approach, Grewe claims that 19th-century justifications of  war were nothing 
128 C. Abel, Letters on International Relations before and during the War of  1870 (1871), vol. 2, at 137.
129 Ibid., at 225.
130 Ibid., at 190.
131 Ibid., at 175.
132 Ibid., at 165.
133 W. Baumgart, Europäisches Konzert und nationale Bewegung: Internationale Beziehungen 1830–1878 (2nd 
edn, 2007), at 399.
134 Lesaffer, supra note 3, at 46. An obligation to declare war was legalized at the Second Hague Convention 
(1907).
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more than propaganda – that is, political rhetoric without any normative meaning.135 
However, by examining the discursive practices more precisely (little research has 
been conducted in this field so far),136 Grewe’s thesis is scarcely tenable. The Concert 
of  Europe developed a regulative order of  peace constituted by power and norms; al-
though this precarious order of  peace was based on (military) coercion, the Concert 
established some form of  a diplomatic ‘culture of  peace’ (Friedenskultur) between the 
great powers.137 It was built on international moderation, multipartite diplomacy and 
behavioural norms derived from the former.138 As mentioned above, the Concert of  
Europe did not legally prohibit war. There was no ‘undeviating rule applicable to all … 
cases’, as Lord Russell had put it in 1841.139 However, ‘the preservation of  the peace 
of  Europe’ became a desired norm between right and might, which was applied in 
practice.
A state’s resort to war was judged by the Concert (just as Napoleon III had asked for 
in the context of  the Franco-Prussian War) and could, if  it was not seen as legitimate, 
result in moderate measures like the withdrawal of  the Concert’s diplomatic support, 
as was the case when Austria ignored Russian and British attempts of  mediation in 
1859 and instead declared war on Piedmont-Sardinia.140 However, it could also result 
in the authorization of  armed measures such as military intervention to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. Thus, Matthias Schulz’s suggestion that 
the Concert of  Europe was a ‘19th century Security Council’ is not im plausible.141 
For instance, in the Crimean War (1853–1856), an alliance of  the Ottoman Empire, 
England, France and Piedmont-Sardinia took action against Russia, in a form, which 
could be labelled an intervention authorized by the Concert of  Europe against a 
Russian ‘crusade’.142 The Treaty of  Paris (1856) created an international sub-system 
in Europe by denying Russian responsibility for the protection of  Christian citizens 
in the Ottoman Empire under threat of  armed sanction (Articles 7 and 9).143 Still, 
in 1877, Russian foreign minister Alexander Gorchakov (1798–1883) stated that 
the independence of  Turkey ‘must be subordinated to the guarantees demanded by 
humanity, the sentiments of  Christian Europe, and the general peace in Europe’.144 He 
thus combined arguments from the discourses on ‘humanitarian intervention’ and 
the restoration of  the European peace – Russia (successfully) broke the treaty of  1856 
by referring to natural law!
The politics of  justifying war in 19th-century state practice lay exactly between 
the precarious normative peace architecture of  the Concert of  Europe and unilateral 
135 Grewe, supra note 7, at 531.
136 Cf. Tischer, supra note 6, at 15.
137 Schulz, supra note 23, at 4.
138 Ibid., at 615; Vec, supra note 27, at 658.
139 Schulz, supra note 23, at 617.
140 Ibid., at 481, 617.
141 Ibid., at 521.
142 O. Figes, Crimea: The Last Crusade (2010).
143 W.E. Mosse, The Rise and Fall of  the Crimean System, 1855–71: The Story of  a Peace Settlement (1963).
144 E. Hertslet, The Map of  Europe by Treaty (1891), vol. 4, at 2524.
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interests of  sovereign states. Not surprisingly, the discourses were shaped by diverse 
narratives ranging from common European values and norms, positive law, unilateral 
rights and interests, Christian faith and natural law and national honour to interna-
tional peace and security. Here, one can rediscover the 19th-century ‘multi-norma-
tivity’ that has been identified in contemporary legal discourse.145 There was no clear 
positive law ordering ius ad bellum, though, at the end of  the century, in the face of  ris-
ing nationalism, some cautious approaches towards further legalization like the 1907 
Drago-Porter Convention were implemented.146
Taking these discourses of  justification more seriously with respect to the history of  
war may therefore help to correct the wrong perception of  the Clausewitzian notions 
on Realpolitik and military necessity, and it may help to deconstruct liberum ius ad bel-
lum as an academic myth. Since what can be asserted in analysing the 19th-century 
politics of  justifying war is that states refrained from claiming liberum ius ad bellum. 
This was even the case when international relations became more contentious after 
1870 and when the dispute between Clausewitzians and liberals was fully developed. 
The fact that Bismarck praised himself  in his memoirs for bypassing the Concert of  
Europe in his unification policy underlines his awareness of  the Concert’s norma-
tive coercion. However, after Bismarck’s retirement in 1890, this awareness of  the 
European normative order seems to have been lost within the Kaiserreich’s political dis-
course. The political context favoured arguments offered by the Clausewitzian school 
of  legal thinking. Isabel Hull recently has emphasized the grave German violations of  
international law in the Great War: ‘It is as if  Imperial Germany could not speak the 
same legal language as the rest of  Europe.’147 After two World Wars, the idea of  war 
as a political instrument in the Clausewitzian sense was finally replaced by an inter-
national rule of  law in the Kantian tradition, which was present in parts of  the 19th-
century legal discourse, as illustrated above.
5 Deconstructing a Myth: The Justification of  War as a 
Forgotten Dispute about Law, Morality and Politics
The 19th century saw the emergence of  complex political and legal discourses on the 
legitimacy of  war. Contrary to what Wilhelm Grewe and his followers have claimed, 
the justification of  war and military force in international legal discourse was highly 
controversial. There was no single, consistent approach or theory in legal thinking 
about war and its legitimacy; instead, war became a contested area in international 
legal doctrine, caught between the theories of  bellum iustum, liberum ius ad bellum and 
ius contra bellum. The passionate dispute about justifying war was characterized by 
arguments originating from different spheres of  justice (politics, morality, law). Legal 
145 Vec, supra note 54.
146 Hague Convention 2 on the Limitations of  the Employment of  the Use of  Force for the Recovery of  
Contract Debts 1907, 36 Stat. 2241; cf. Vec, supra note 27, at 660.
147 Hull, supra note 71, at 331.
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discourse and state practice were therefore shaped by ‘multi-normativity’, despite 
positivism.148
Two schools of  thinking emerged in 19th-century legal doctrine, differentiated by 
political and legal mentalities. One school argued against a normative term of  war 
and in favour of  war as a political instrument, a duel between states. Lawyers with a 
political outlook legitimated war as the normal, de facto progressive and honourable 
status of  international relations, not to be condemned as morally reprehensible in the 
Kantian sense. For them, war was not a term of  law or justice but, rather, ein nothwen-
diger Culturträger, as expressed by Lueder. Clausewitzian lawyers therefore argued in 
favour of  the unlimited right of  the sovereign state to go to war, liberum ius ad bellum, 
and against the need for a legal justification of  war. For these lawyers, bellum iustum 
no longer played a role for waging war. It was replaced by the concept of  ‘military 
necessity’. This denial of  bellum iustum and natural law was based on a purely posi-
tivist-empirical concept of  law, shaped by a sociological language. Here we can find 
contemporary advocates for Grewe’s thesis.
However, what often has been ignored in the history of  international law is the 
fact that there was another bloc of  lawyers for whom war was morally and legally 
forbidden – an evil to be overcome through legalization. For them, war was a legal 
dispute (ein Rechtsstreit) over public international law; thus, war needed a legal justifi-
cation.149 Bellum iustum still played an important role in this perspective, as war had to 
be justified in terms of  ‘just war’, even if  ‘just’ more or less meant the same as ‘legal’. 
However, these lawyers referred both to morality and natural law, as positivism alone 
seemed yet unable to adequately order the justification of war.
With regard to Grewe’s thesis, one has to emphasize the intensive disputes between 
different normative and scientific views on war; the thesis of  liberum ius ad bellum was 
by no means taken for granted in the entire 19th-century legal discourse. While there 
were voices in favour of  war as a political instrument (liberum ius ad bellum), others 
wanted to prohibit war with recourse to moral and legal arguments (ius contra bellum). 
The two schools of  legal thinking did not simply coexist; lawyers with political and 
legal perspectives competed with one another over authority in international legal dis-
course. In fact, even contemporary proponents of  the unlimited sovereign right to war 
grappled with opposite opinions and their multi-normative foundations.
Consequently, one has to ask why the history of  international law has focused on 
a realist perspective on war and law in the 19th century to this point. One possible 
answer has been given in this article – namely, the historical context of  the violent 
German unification in 1870–1871 was a turning point for dealing with the ques-
tion of  the legitimacy of  war. This is not to say that the idea of  liberum ius ad bellum 
was only common in German legal discourse; authors from other countries shared the 
idea of  war as an extra-legal phenomenon, and many prominent critics of  liberum ius 
ad bellum were Germans. Still, a case can be made for the argument that liberum ius 
148 Vec, supra note 54.
149 Bluntschli, supra note 39, at 287, 290.
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ad bellum and ‘military necessity’ were particularly significant in the legal discourse 
of  the German Kaiserreich. The Clausewitzian tradition in legal thinking prevailed 
even after World War I, with Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) being its main exponent. In 
Schmitt’s conception of  state sovereignty as a precondition of  (international) law (ein 
Rechtsvoraussetzungsbegriff),150 the sovereign was authorized to use military force; for 
Schmitt, he therefore had a ‘free right to go to war’.151
But also in this context, the thesis of  liberum ius ad bellum in the 19th century had 
been contested by scholars like Arthur Nussbaum (1877–1964) and Hans Kelsen 
(1881–1973). For Kelsen, war was a coercive sanction of  the universal legal order.152 
Remarkably, Nussbaum criticized that Lueder’s refutation of  a just war, and the the-
sis of  liberum ius ad bellum suffered from ‘the infusion of  arguments which smack 
of  enthusiasm for war’.153 However, this realist tradition in German legal doctrine 
has been revitalized by a 20th-century German lawyer, who was deeply influenced 
by Carl Schmitt and would become the author of  a standard book on the history of  
international law. This author was Wilhelm G. Grewe, whose Epochs of  International 
Law is a history of  international law as a history of  political fights for hegemony and 
supremacy.154 Therefore, it is not surprising to find the thesis of  liberum ius ad bellum in 
Grewe’s treatise. To some extent, the German, Clausewitzian tradition thereby contin-
ued in the history of  international law.
Since there were two competing viewpoints in 19th-century international doctrine, 
a closer look at political practice seems to be appropriate.155 In contemporary state 
practice, liberum ius ad bellum was not claimed. Justifications of  war were caught be-
tween unilateral aims and the normative framework of  the Concert of  Europe. Thus, 
what seems to be central in writing histories of  the politics of  international law is 
the plurality of  normative rules and a critical understanding of  their (mis-)use in po-
litical practice. This plurality calls for interdisciplinary research; norms are disputed 
in discourses, their authority increases and vanishes throughout history. A  ‘decon-
structionist’,156 critical ‘history of  normativity’157 has to dissect the formation and 
enforcement of  normative orders understood as contested systems of  knowledge.158 
A  quasi-genealogical access to the relationship between political practice and legal 
150 Cf. M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of  International Legal Argument (2005), at 227; 
Teschke, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Concepts of  War: A Categorical Failure’, in J. Meierhenrich and O. Simon (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of  Carl Schmitt (2014) 1.
151 C. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff (2nd edn, 1988).
152 H. Kelsen, Staatslehre (1925), at 125; H. Kelsen, Peace through Law (1944); cf. V. Neumann, Carl Schmitt 
als Jurist (2015), at 425.
153 Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 474.
154 Fassbender, ‘Stories of  War and Peace: On Writing the History of  International Law in the “Third Reich” 
and After’, 13 European Journal of  International Law (2002) 479, at 511ff.
155 Tischer, supra note 6; Carty, ‘Doctrine versus State Practice’, in Fassbender and Peters, supra note 3, 972.
156 A. Carty, Philosophy of  International Law (2007), at 9.
157 Renn, ‘The Globalization of  Knowledge in History and Its Normative Challenges’, 22 Rechtsgeschichte 
(2014) 52.
158 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of  Knowledge (1969 [2002]).
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theory may help to deconstruct one-sided narratives as academic myths, presenting 
only a suitable section of  the more complex historical truth. An example of  such a 
genealogical approach has been presented in this article. The proposition of  so-called 
liberum ius ad bellum leans on a one-sided, realist tradition in the history of  interna-
tional law, which has been revitalized by Wilhelm G. Grewe. Faced with the highly 
controversial legal disputes in the 19th century, and with the complex justification 
discourses in state practice, it seems to be justified to formulate the thesis that liberum 
ius ad bellum constitutes a myth in the history of  international law.
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